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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

Case No. 990286-CA

:
Priority No. 2

ALFRED T. LEE

:

Defendant/Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals his conviction for retail theft, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (1995). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1. Should this Court consider defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel raised for the first time on appeal when defendant's claim depends on assertions
of fact that find no support in the record?
"When a defendant raises an ineffective assistance claim for the first time on
appeal, the claim will be reviewed only 'if the . . . record is adequate to permit
decision of the issue.'" State v. Penman. 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998)
1

(quoting State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991) (omission in original).
2. Even assuming the record is sufficient to evaluate defendant's claim, was
defendant's trial counsel ineffective for not calling a possible witness, when such a
decision is reasonable in light of the fact that there is na evidence that the witness could
be located or that the witness would testify favorably to defendant?
"[When] a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on
appeal without a prior evidentiary hearing, it presents a question of law." State v.
Bryant. 965 P.2d 539, 542 (Utah App. 1998) (citation omitted). However, this Court
"'"indulge[s] in the strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistancef.]"'" Id,, (quoting State v. Garrett. 849 P.2d
578, 579 (Utah App. 1993) (quoting Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 689
(1984))). "'If a rational basis for counsel's performance can be articulated, [the Court]
will assume counsel acted competently.'" IcL (quoting State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d
461, 468 (Utah App. 1993)).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Resolution of this case does not involve the interpretation of any constitutional
provision, statute, or rule of court.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with retail theft, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (1995) (R. 1). A jury found defendant guilty as charged
2

(R. 53, 96:170-171). The trial court sentenced defendant to a term of zero-to-five
years (R. 58, 96:180). Defendant filed an untimely appeal, (R. 71-73), and the Utah
Court of Appeals summarily dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction (R. 78-79). The trial
court issued a "corrective sentence" pursuant to State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36 (Utah
1981) on March 23, 1999, (R. 84-85, 96:184-186), and defendant timely appealed from
the corrective sentence (R. 87-89).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant shoplifted a gray jacket from Deseret Industries in Ogden, Utah, just
nine days after the same store gave him a free jacket to wear while he looked for a job
(R. 96:57-58, 96:61-69, 96:97-102).
On May 10, 1998, defendant, then an inmate at the Northern Utah Correctional
Center, was visited by Mr. Richard Gootch, who issues vouchers from the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints to inmates for free clothing from Deseret Industries so
that they can look for jobs (R. 96:97-98). Mr. Gootch issued defendant a voucher for
several items of clothing, including a jacket (R. 96:98-99). On May 11, 1998,
defendant redeemed his voucher at Deseret Industries in Ogden, Utah, and was given a
jacket (R. 96:100-102).
On May 20, 1998, Officer Steve Reeves, an off-duty Ogden City police officer,
was working as an undercover security officer in Deseret Industries in Ogden, Utah (R.
96:57-58). Officer Reeves observed defendant walking around the store wearing a
3

white cowboy hat and a green backpack (R. 96:61-62). He then observed defendant go
to the rack of jackets and take a gray jacket from the end of the rack (R. 96:63-64).
Officer Reeves had noticed and admired that gray jacket earlier in the day and had
removed it from the rack and looked at it (R. 96:64). The gray jacket had a ski pass
and a price tag attached to it (R. 96:65). Officer Reeves observed as defendant
crouched between two racks of clothing, took his backpack off and opened it, and
removed the ski pass from the jacket with a pair of fingernail clippers (R. 96:66-68).
Officer Reeves then watched as defendant put the gray jacket into his backpack, zip up
and put the backpack on, look at a few other items and then attempt to leave the store
(R. 96:68-69).
As defendant was exiting the store, Officer Reeves apprehended him (R. 96:69).
Officer Reeves identified himself as a security officer and escorted defendant to an
office in the store (R. 96:70-71). Once in the office, Officer Reeves opened
defendant's backpack and found two jackets, the gray jacket that he watched defendant
shoplift and a second jacket colored red and black (R. 96:71, 96:121). When asked
why he stole the jacket, defendant replied, "4I needed another jacketQ'" (R. 96:86).
Defendant testified in his own behalf at trial (R. 96:111). He testified that the
gray jacket was the one he had received with the voucher on May 11, and that he was
wearing the gray jacket when he entered Deseret Industries on May 20 (R. 96:112,
96:115), Defendant acknowledged, however, that he had worn the red and black jacket
4

earlier that day (R. 96:119). Defendant claimed that before arriving at Deseret
Industries he had been at a truck stop where he applied for a job and was turned down
because he had a beard (R. 96:113). He testified that "some young kids" had given
him a ride from the truck stop to Deseret Industries (R. 96:113). Defendant asserted
that once inside Deseret Industries he got hot and removed the gray jacket he claimed
he was wearing and put it in his backpack (R. 96:115).
At trial, defendant never gave the name of the truck stop where he claimed to
have applied for a job (See R. 96:111-133). He never gave the name of any truck stop
employee he spoke with (id.). When questioned about where he got the red and black
jacket, defendant first claimed that he "bought it from a guy[,]" and later asserted that
his roommate at the correctional center loaned it to him along with a pair of pants (R.
96:119, 96:122). Defendant claimed, however, that he was could not remember his
roommate's name stating, "I don't remember names[]" (R. 96:122-123).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The record is insufficient for this Court to consider defendant's ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Defendant claims that his trial counsel's performance was
deficient because his counsel failed to call as an alibi witness a truck stop employee
who allegedly saw defendant wearing a gray jacket before defendant entered Deseret
Industries. The record, however, contains no information regarding whether defendant
informed his trial counsel of the alleged alibi witness or gave counsel sufficient
5

information to contact the alleged alibi witness. There is also no information in the
record suggesting that the alleged alibi witness has a recollection of defendant wearing
a gray jacket. It is defendant's responsibility to support his claim with an adequate
record. Without an adequate record, defendant's claim .is a bare allegation without any
basis for appellate review.
Even if this Court were to review defendant's claim, the claim fails because in
order to make an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must show that
there is no reasonable strategic grounds for his counsel's decision. On this record,
there are at least two possible explanations for defense counsel's actions. First, counsel
may not have been able to contact the truck stop employee: inability to contact a
witness is a rational basis for failing to do so. Or, if counsel had actually contacted the
truck stop employee, the employee may have had no recollection of defendant wearing
a gray jacket. A witness's inability to provide favorable testimony is a rational basis
for failing to call a witness. Because there are rational grounds for trial counsel's
actions, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance must fail on this record.

6

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE BECAUSE THE
RECORD IS INADEQUATE TO CONSIDER
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
The record is inadequate for this Court to consider defendant's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the first time on appeal. "'[Ineffective
assistance claims raised for the first time on appeal can only be reviewed in "unusual
. . . peculiar, narrow circumstances."'" State v. Vessey. 967 P.2d 960, 964 (Utah '
App. 1998) (quoting State v. Cook. 881 P.2d 913, 915 n. 3 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting
State v. Humphries. 818 P.2d 1027, 1029 (Utah 1991)) (omission in original)).
"'Those circumstances exist when there is new counsel on appeal and there is an
adequate trial record' for [the Court] to review defendant's allegations of ineffective
assistance of counsel." IcL (quoting State v. Johnson. 823 P.2d 484, 487 (Utah App.
1991)).
Defendant has new counsel for this appeal, but the record does not support the
allegation of ineffective assistance. This claim requires that the record show "'first,
that his counsel rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and,
7

second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.'" State v. Arguelles. 921
P.2d 439, 441 (Utah 1996) (quoting Parsons v. Barnes. 871 P.2d 516, 521 (Utah) cert,
denied. 513 U.S. 966 (1994) (additional quotations omitted)).
This defendant's claim depends on the following factual assertions, none of
which are supported by the record: 1) that the truck stop employee who spoke with
defendant has a recollection of seeing defendant wearing the gray jacket; 2) that
defendant informed his trial counsel of the existence of the possible alibi witness; 3)
that defendant provided his trial counsel with sufficient information to contact the truck
stop employee who spoke with defendant; and 4) that trial counsel failed to contact the
truck stop employee. See Br. Aplt. at 8-9. The inadequacy of the record to support
defendant's allegations is evidenced first by the fact that defendant is unable to provide
record citations in support of these allegations in his brief. See Br. Aplt. at 8-9.
Indeed, defendant does not even address three of the four factual issues critical
to his claim. Defendant does not allege that he informed his trial counsel of the
existence of a possible alibi witness. Defendant does not allege that he provided his
trial counsel with sufficient information to allow counsel to contact the possible alibi
witness. And, although he does allege (without any reference to the record) that "[t]he
employee of the truck stop, in conducting the interview, would have seen him wearing
the jacket[,]" defendant fails to allege that the truck stop employee has a recollection of
defendant wearing a gray jacket. Br. Aplt. at 8. If defendant did not inform his trial
8

counsel of the existence of a possible alibi witness, or if defendant could not provide
his trial counsel with sufficient information to allow him to contact the potential alibi
witness, then his trial counsel's failure to contact the possible alibi witness cannot be
deemed deficient performance. Furthermore, even assuming defendant's trial counsel
contacted the truck stop employee who spoke with defendant, counsel's failure to call
the truck stop employee as a witness was not deficient performance if the truck stop
employee had no recollection of defendant wearing a gray jacket. By failing to address
these issues, defendant has failed to make out a claim of ineffective assistance.
Defendant does allege that his trial counsel made no effort contact a truck stop
employee as an alibi witness. Br. Aplt. at 3, 9. However, the only information in the
record that could possibly support this allegation is the fact that a truck stop employee
was not called as a witness. The fact that a witness is not called at trial does not,
however, mean that counsel did not contact, or attempt to contact, the witness.
"'When a defendant predicates error to [an appellate court], he has the duty and
responsibility of supporting such allegation by an adequate record. Absent that record,
defendant's assignment of error stands as a unilateral allegation which the review[ing]
court has no power to determine. [An appellate court] simply cannot rule on a question
which depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the record.'" State v.
Penman, 964 P.2d 1157, 1162 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Wulffenstein. 657
P.2d 289, 293 (Utah 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1044 (1983)) (internal citation
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omitted). Because defendant's claim depends on allegations which are not supported by
the record, this Court should refuse to consider defendant's claim and affirm
defendant's conviction and sentence. Id.
POINT II
TfflS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION AND SENTENCE BECAUSE EVEN
ASSUMING DEFENDANT'S BRIEF IS ADEQUATE
AND THE RECORD IS SUFFICIENT TO ADDRESS
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM, DEFENDANT'S TRIAL
COUNSEL DID NOT RENDER INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE.
Even assuming the record is sufficient for this Court to address defendant's
claim, defendant's trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance. To prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show "'first, that his counsel
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, that
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant.'" ArgueHes, 921 P.2d 439, 441 (Utah
1996) (quoting Parsons. 871 P.2d at 521 (quoting Bundv v. Deland. 763 P.2d 803, 805
(Utah 1988))). Defendant's claim fails on the first prong.
The first prong of the ineffective assistance test requires defendant to "overcome
a strong presumption that counsel rendered adequate assistance." Taylor v. Warden.
905 P.2d 277, 282 (Utah 1995). "Put another way, 'if a rational basis for counsel's
performance can be articulated, [the Court] will assume counsel acted competently.'"
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State v. Brvant. 965 P.2d 539, 542-543 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State v. Tennyson,
850 P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993)).
On this record, there are at least two possible strategic or rational bases for not
calling the truck stop employee as an alibi witness. First, defendant may not have been
able to provide sufficient information to enable counsel to contact the truck stop
employee. In his testimony at trial defendant never gave the name of the truck stop
where he claimed to have applied for employment, and he never gave the name of any
employee from that truck stop (see R. 96:111-133). Defendant even testified that he
has difficulty remembering names (R. 96:123). Defendant's own testimony suggests
that he may have been unable to provide his trial counsel with sufficient information to
contact the truck stop employee.
Second, even assuming counsel was able to actually contact the employee, there
is nothing in the record to indicate whether the truck stop employee had any
recollection of defendant or of the specific color of his jacket.
"Since '"conceivable tactical bas[e]s"' for defense counsel's actions are apparent
and have some support in the record, and defendant has not overcome the * "strong
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance,"' [this Court] must assume defense counsel acted
competently." State v. Brvant. 965 P.2d 539, 543-544 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting State
v. Garrett, 849 P.2d 578, 579 (Utah App. 1993) (internal quotation omitted)).
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that this Court affirm
defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _|_£ day of August, 1999.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

SCOTTKEITH WILSON
Assistant Attorney General
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